We present a signalling theory of quantitative easing in which open market operations that change the duration of outstanding nominal government debt a¤ect the incentives of the central bank in determining the real interest rate. In a time consistent (Markov-perfect) equilibrium of a sticky-price model with coordinated monetary and …scal policy, we show that shortening the duration of outstanding government debt provides an incentive to the central bank to keep short-term real interest rates low in future in order to avoid capital losses. In a liquidity trap situation then, where the current short-term nominal interest rate is up against the zero lower bound, quantitative easing can be e¤ective to …ght de ‡ation and a negative output gap as it leads to lower real long-term interest rates by lowering future expected real short-term interest rates. We show illustrative numerical examples that suggest that the bene…ts of quantitative easing in a liquidity trap can be large in a way that is not fully captured by some recent empirical studies.
The government is simply exchanging longer term liabilities in the hands of the public with shorter term ones.
The main goal of quantitative easing in the United States was to reduce long-term interest rates, even when the short-term nominal interest rate could not be reduced further, and thereby, stimulate the economy. In addition, Hamilton and Wu (2012), Swanson and Williams (2013) , and Bauer and Rudebusch (2013) also …nd similar e¤ects on long-term interest rates. 2 From a theoretical perspective however, the e¤ect of such policy is not obvious since open market operations of this kind are neutral (or irrelevant) in standard macroeconomic models. This was pointed out …rst in a well-known contribution by Wallace (1981) and further extended by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) to a model with sticky prices and an explicit zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. These papers showed how absent some restrictions in asset trade that prevent arbitrage, a change in the relative supplies of various assets in the hands of the private sector has no e¤ect on equilibrium quantities and asset prices in prototypical macroeconomic models.
For this reason, some papers have recently incorporated frictions such as participation constraints due to "preferred habitat" motives in order to make assets of di¤erent maturities imperfect substitutes. This in turn negates the neutrality of open market operations as in such an environment, quantitative easing can reduce long-term interest rates because it decreases the risk-premium. For example, Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2012) augment a quantitative sticky price model with such segmented market frictions and show that purchases of long-term bonds by the central bank can reduce long-term interest rates by decreasing the risk-premium. They nevertheless …nd the e¤ects to be fairly modest: based on their estimated model, they …nd that a $600 billion reduction in outstanding long-term debt, along with a commitment to keep short-term interest rates at zero for 4 quarters, increases in ‡ation by 3 basis points (annualized) and GDP growth by 0:13% (annualized).
As Woodford (2012) argues however (building on Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) ), quantitative easing need not be e¤ective only because it reduces risk premiums. It can also reduce long-term interest rates if such policy intervention signals to the private sector that the central bank will keep the short-term interest rates low once the zero lower bound is no longer a constraint in the future. In fact, arguably, much of the …ndings of the empirical literature on reduction of long-term interest rates due to quantitative easing can be attributed to expectations of low future short-term interest rates. Indeed, Krishnamurthy and VissingJorgensen (2011) and Bauer and Rudebusch (2013) …nd evidence in support of this channel in their study of the various quantitative easing programs. 3 Our contribution is to provide a formal theoretical model of such a "signalling" role of quantitative easing in a standard general equilibrium sticky price model. 4 In particular, we consider coordinated optimal monetary and …scal policy under discretion and show that in a Markov-perfect (time-consistent) equilibrium, shortening the duration of outstanding government debt provides an incentive to the central bank to keep the short-term real interest rate low in the future. This constitutes optimal policy under discretion because it avoids capital losses on the government's balance sheet, which if realized, would entail raising taxes that are costly in the model. The key intuition for this result is that if the government holds larger amount of short-term debt then current real short term rate directly a¤ects the cost of rolling the debt over period by period, while the cost of rolling over long-term debt is not a¤ected as strongly period by period (since the interest rate on that debt is predetermined at the time the policy is set). This implies that shortening the maturity of outstanding debt increases the incentive of the government to keep real rates low. In a liquidity trap situation, where the current short-term nominal interest rate is up against the zero lower bound and the economy su¤ers from de ‡ation and a large negative output gap, it is well known that signalling about future policy can be very e¤ective. For example, Krugman (1998) emphasizes the importance of raising in ‡ation expectations and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) emphasize the commitment to lower future short-term nominal interest rate and allowing output to overshoot its steady state level. But are these type of commitments credible? In fact, it is well-understood that commitment to future expansionary policy at the zero lower bound is di¢ cult due to time-inconsistency problems. While the public understands the bene…ts today of committing to lower future real interest rates, it also appreciates the government's incentive in the future to renege on these promises once the economy has recovered (this leads to the so called "de ‡ation bias" developed in Eggertsson (2006) ). Our main result, then, is that quantitative easing, or shortening the duration of government debt, makes promises of expansionary future policy "credible"
because it provides an incentive to the central bank to keep short-term real interest rates low in future to avoid balance sheet losses. This mitigates the extent of de ‡ation and negative output gap that would occur otherwise in the Markov-perfect equilibrium.
5 3 Woodford (2012) makes a similar argument regarding empirical evidence on most recent balance sheet policies by the Federal Reserve. 4 Gagnon et al (2011) label this role played by the expected path of future short-term interest rates as a "signalling" role for quantitative easing. In the literature on central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets, this term has been used often and appears to have been …rst coined by Mussa (1981) to discuss how foreign exchange interventions might be used to signal future changes in monetary policy. 5 Jeanne and Svensson (2007) assume net worth concerns on the part of the central bank directly and show how buying foreign exchange is useful during a liquidity trap as it commits the central bank to not appreciating the exchange rate in future (since doing so would entail capital losses on the central bank's balance sheet). Berriel, Bhattarai, and Mendes (2013) show that buying long-term bonds acts as a commitment device for the same reason. The main di¤erence in this paper is the consideration of joint conduct of monetary and …scal policy along with a welfare-theoretic loss function for the government.
In our calibrated model, we show numerical experiments in which these e¤ects of quantitative easing can be very large. For example, with government debt maturity of 16 quarters, we calibrate the size of the negative demand shock (that makes the zero lower bound binding) such that output drops by 10% and (annualized) in ‡ation by 2%: In such a case, reducing the duration of government debt by 7 months decreases (annualized) de ‡ation and the negative e¤ect on output by 95:4 and 140 basis points respectively. 6 This suggests that the signalling channel may explain all the e¤ects of quantitative easing found in the empirical literature. In addition, we show that if the duration were to be reduced by 20:6 months, that is triple the size of our baseline experiment for quantitative easing, the negative output gap at the zero lower bound would be completely eliminated.
Before presenting the model we want to clarify an important element of our analysis. A key to understanding optimal policy in the New Keynesian model at the zero bound is that it involves committing to lower future short-term real interest rates. 7 The short term real interest rate is the di¤erence between future short-term nominal interest rate and expected in ‡ation. A lower short-term real interest rate can be achieved by either a lower future short-term nominal interest rate or higher future expected in ‡ation. A commitment of this kind will under some parameterization of the model be achieved via higher expected in ‡ation and higher future short-term nominal interest rates -even if the di¤erence between the two (the real rate) is going down. An implication of this is that a successful policy of quantitative easing aimed at lowering long-term real interest rate may involve an increase in expected future nominal interest rates and therefore, an increase in long-term nominal rates at the zero lower bound. This is relevant because some empirical analyses of the e¤ect of quantitative easing focus only on long-term nominal interest rates, which our analysis suggests is not a su¢ cient statistic. Even if long-term nominal interest rate decline very little in response to quantitative easing, or even if they increase, this does not by itself suggest that the policy is ine¤ective, as long as the real interest rate is declining.
Finally, while the paper connects with work related to the zero lower bound in models with nominal rigidities, it also is related to the theoretical literature on how the maturity structure of debt can be manipulated to eliminate the dynamic inconsistency found in many monetary models (in particular the "in ‡ation bias") such as Lucas and Stokey (1983) , Svensson (1987 and 2006) , and Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004). While the focus of these papers is generally on policies that eliminates the incentive to in ‡ate, the in ‡ation bias, (and thus generally imply a lengthening of the duration of government debt relative to one-period debt), our application can be thought of as precisely the opposite, that is, the maturity structure of debt is made shorter to solve the "de ‡ation bias."
2 The Model
Private sector
The model is a standard general equilibrium sticky-price closed economy set-up with an output cost of taxation, along the lines of Eggertsson (2006) . The government conducts coordinated monetary and …scal policy under discretion. While it may seem like a distraction to write out the fully non-linear model and de…ne the equilibrium in that context, as we will later on analyze a linear quadratic version of this model, 6 We use these numbers for illustration based on estimates in Chadha, Turner, and Zampoli (2013), which suggest that the average maturity of treasury debt held outside the Federal Reserve was around 4 years in the last 10 years and that recent Federal Reserve balance sheet policies reduced the maturity by around 7 months. 7 Werning (2012) makes a related point regarding the ultimate goal of optimal policy as one of generating an output boom once the trap is over. this is useful for two reasons. First, we will formally show that the linearized …rst-order conditions of the government's original non-linear problem are the same as in our linear quadratic model (and this in general need not be the case, see e.g. Eggertsson (2006) ). Second, the non-linear version of the problem will be important once we allow for fully time-varying duration of government debt, where the linear quadratic approximation is no longer valid.
The main di¤erence in the model from the literature is the introduction of long-term government debt.
A representative household maximizes expected discounted utility over the in…nite horizon
where is the discount factor, C t is household consumption of the composite …nal good, G t is government consumption of the composite …nal good, h t is quantity supplied of labor of type i, and t is a shock. E t is the mathematical expectation operator conditional on period-t information, u (:) is concave and strictly increasing in C t ; g (:) is concave and strictly increasing in G t ; and v (:) is increasing and convex in h t :
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The composite …nal good is an aggregate of a continuum of varieties indexed by i;
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among the varieties. The optimal price index for the composite …nal good is given by
; where p t (i) is the price of the variety i: The demand for the individual varieties is then given by
: Finally, G t is de…ned analogously to C t and so we omit detailed description of government spending.
The household is subject to a sequence of ‡ow budget constraints
where n t is nominal wage, Z t (i) is nominal pro…t of …rm i, B S t is the household's holding of one-period risk-less nominal government bond at the beginning of period t + 1, B t is a perpetuity bond, S t its price, and its decay factor (further described below). A t+1 is the value of the complete set of state-contingent securities at the beginning of period t + 1 and Q t;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor between periods t and t+1 that is used to value random nominal income in period t+1 in monetary units at date t.
9 Finally, i t 1 is the nominal interest rate on government bond holdings at the beginning of period t and T t is government taxes. The way we introduce long term bonds into the model is to assume that government debt not only takes the form of a one period riskfree debt, B S t ; but that the government also issues a perpetuity in period t which pays j dollars j + 1 periods later, for each j 0 and some decay factor 0 < 1 .
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S t is the price of the perpetuity nominal bond which depends on the decay factor . The main convenience of introducing long term bond in this way is that we can consider government debt of arbitrary duration. For example, a value of = 0 implies that this bond is simply a short-term bond while = 1 corresponds to a classic console bond. More generally, in an environment with stable prices, the duration of this bond is
(1 ) 1 . Thus, this simple assumption allows us to explore a change in the duration of government debt in a transparent way. The appendix contains details on why the budget constraint takes the form (2). In particular, the modelling of long-term bond in this way admits a simple recursive formulation of the price of old government bonds. 8 We abstract from money in the model and are thus directly considering the "cash-less limit." 9 The household is subject to a standard no-Ponzi game condition. 1 0 We follow Woodford (2001) .
For now, observe that we treat as a constant. We will explore a one-time reduction in this duration as a main "comparative static" of interest. In other words, a reduction in answers the question: What does a permanent reduction in the maturity of government debt do? Toward the end of the paper, however, we will extend the analysis so that becomes a time varying choice variable t : The main reason for our initial benchmark assumption is simplicity (and the fact that we get a clean comparative static). But perhaps more importantly, we will see later that a one-time reduction in (in a liquidity trap) turns out to be a reasonably good approximation in our model because t is close to a random walk under optimal policy under discretion at a positive interest rate.
The maximization problem of the household is now entirely standard, with the additional feature of the portfolio choice between long and short term bonds. 11 Let us now turn to the …rm side of the model.
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms indexed by i. Each …rm produces a variety i according to the production function that is linear in labor y t (i) = h t (i). As in Rotemberg (1983) , …rms face a cost of changing prices given by d
. This adjustment cost makes the …rm's pricing problem dynamic. The demand function for variety i is given by
where Y t is total demand for goods. The …rm maximizes expected discounted pro…ts
where the period pro…ts Z t (i) are given by
where s is a production subsidy which we will set to eliminate the steady state distortion of monopolistic competition as is common in the literature. 12 We can now write down the necessary conditions for equilibrium that arise from the maximization problems of the private sector described above. We focus on a symmetric equilibria where all …rms charge the same price and produce the same amount of output. Note that these conditions hold for any government policy.
The households optimality conditions are given by
1 1 The problem of the household is thus to choose {C t+s ; h t+s (i); B S t+s ; B t+s ; A t+s } to maximize (1) subject to a sequence of ‡ow budget constraints given by (2) , while taking as exogenously given initial wealth and {P t+s; n t+s (i); i t+s ; S t+s ( ); Q t;t+s ; t+s ; Z t+s (i); T t+s }. 1 2 The problem of the …rm is thus to choose {p t+s (i)} to maximize (4), while taking as exogenously given fP t+s; Y t+s ; n t+s (i); Q t;t+s ; t+s g where t = Pt Pt 1 is gross in ‡ation. 13 The …rm's optimality condition from price-setting is given by
where with some abuse of notion we have replaced v h with v y since in a symmetric equilibrium h t (i) =
Government
There is an output cost of taxation (for example, as in Barro (1979) ) captured by the function s(T t T ) where T is the steady-state level of taxes. Thus, in steady-state, there is no tax cost. Total government spending is then given by
where G t is aggregate government consumption of the composite …nal good de…ned before.
It remains to write down the (consolidated) ‡ow budget constraint of the government. Note that the government issues both a one-period bond B S t and the perpetuity B t . We can write the ‡ow budget constraint as
Next, we assume that the one-period bond is in net-zero supply (i.e. B S t = 0; which makes clear that we only introduce this bond explicitly as the risk free short term nominal rate is the key policy instrument of monetary policy), and write the budget constraint in real terms as
where b t = Bt Pt . We now de…ne …scal policy as the choice of T t ; F t ; and b t . For simplicity, we will from now on suppose that total government spending is constant so that F t = F: Monetary policy is the choice of i t :
We simply impose the zero bound constraint on the setting of monetary policy so that
Private sector equilibrium
The goods market clearing condition gives the overall resource constraint as
We can then de…ne the private sector equilibrium, that is the set of possible equilibria that are consistent with household and …rm maximization and the technological constraints of the model. A private sector equilibrium is a collection of stochastic processes fY t+s; C t+s ; b t+s ; S t+s ; t+s ; i t+s ; Q t;t+s ; T t+s ; F t+s ; G t+s g for s 0 that satisfy equations (5)- (7), (8), (9) , and (11), for each s 0; given b t 1 and an exogenous stochastic process for f t+s g: To determine the set of possible equilibria in the model, we now need to be explicit about how policy is determined. 1 3 We may also append a standard transversality condition as a part of these conditions or a natural borrowing limit. 1 4 This bound can be explicitly derived in a variety of environment, see e.g. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) .
subject to the private sector equilibrium conditions (12)- (16) and the expectation functions (20)- (22) . Note that in equilibrium, the expectation functions satisfy the rational expectation restrictions (17)- (19) . Here, U (:) is the utility function of the household in (1) and V (:) is the value function. 17 The detailed formulation of this maximization problem and the associated …rst-order necessary conditions, as well as their linear approximation, are provided in the appendix. 18 4 Linear-quadratic approach
Rather than studying the fully non-linear policy problem, we will instead do a linear-quadratic approximation of the policy problem. The main reason for this approach is that it clari…es the interpretation of our result, and connects more closely to some of the earlier literature. As we will see shortly (Proposition 1), however, this approach yields the same solution as if we would have approximated directly the non-linear …rst-order conditions of the problem (23) . When moving to time-varying , however, a linear quadratic approximation will no longer be valid, in which case we will only rely on the fully non-linear statement of the government's decision problem.
We approximate our model around an e¢ cient non-stochastic steady-state with zero in ‡ation. 19 Moreover, there are no tax collection costs in steady-state 20 . Thus, there is a non-zero steady-state level of debt.
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In steady-state, we assume that there is some …xed total market-value of public debt Sb = : Then, the following relationships hold
We log-linearize the private sector equilibrium conditions around the steady state above to get the relation- (27) where and are a function of structural model parameters that do not depend upon and r e t is the e¢ cient rate of interest that is a function of the shock t . 22 The coe¢ cient T is also independent of in our experiment. 23 Here, (24) (27) is the linearized forward-looking asset-pricing condition. 24 1 7 Using compact notation, note that we can write the utility function as [u (Ct) + g (F s(Tt T )) v (Yt)] t: 1 8 Note here that we assume that the government and the private-sector move simultaneously. 1 9 Variables without a t subscript denote a variable in steady state. Note that output is going to be at the e¢ cient level in steady state because of the assumption of the production subsidy (appropriately chosen) we have made before. 2 0 We can think of this as being due to a limited set of lump sum taxation. 2 1 The steady-state is e¢ cient even with non-zero steady-state debt because of our assumption that taxes do not entail output loss in steady-state. 2 2 The details of the derivation are in the appendix. 2 3 Since we are thinking of changes in in our experiment as exchanging short bonds with long bonds -e¤ectively reducing/increasing -this interpretation would imply that total value of debt in steady-state --should remain unchanged. 2 4 Variables with hats denote log-deviations from steady state except for the nominal interest rate, which is given as{t =
Since in the non-stochastic steady state with zero in ‡ation, 1 + i = 1 ; this means that the zero lower bound on nominal interest (24) and (25) are standard relationships depicting how current output depends on expected future output and the current real interest rate gap and how current in ‡ation depends on expected future in ‡ation and the current output respectively. 25 (26) shows that since debt is nominal, its real value is decreased by in ‡ation. Higher taxes also reduce the debt burden. Moreover, an increase in the price of the perpetuity bond decreases the real value of debt, with the e¤ect depending on the duration of debt: longer the duration, lower is the e¤ect of the bond price on debt. Finally, (27) shows that the price of the perpetuity bond is determined by (the negative of) expected present value of future short-term interest rates. Hence, lower current or future short-term nominal interest rate will increase the price of the perpetuity bond. Note that when = 0; all debt is of one-period duration and (26) reduces to the standard linearized government budget constraint while (27) reduces toŜ t = { t :
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A second-order approximation of household utility around the e¢ cient non-stochastic steady state gives
where and T are a function of structural model parameters. 27 Compared to the standard loss-function in models with sticky prices that contains in ‡ation and output, (28) To analyze optimal policy under discretion in the linear-quadratic framework we once again maximize utility, subject the now linear private sector equilibrium conditions, taking into account that the expectation are functions of the state variables of the game. In the linear system, the exogenous state is now summarized with r e t while the endogenous state variable is once againb t 1 : Moreover, the expectation variables appearing in the system are now E tŶt+1 ; E tŜt+1 ; and E t t+1 . Accordingly, we will de…ne the game in terms of the state variables (r e t ;b t 1 ) and the government now takes as given the expectation functions Y E (b t ; r e t ); S E (b t ; r e t ); and E (b t ; r e t ): The discretionary government's optimization problem can then be written recursively as a linear-quadratic dynamic programming problem
Observe that once again, in equilibrium, the expectation functions need to satisfy the rational expectations
; and E t t+1 = E (b t ; r e t ): We prove in the proposition below that this linear-quadratic approach gives identical linear optimality rates imposes the following bound on{t :{t (1 ) : 2 5 We write directly in terms of output rather than the output gap since we will not be considering shocks that perturb the e¢ cient level of output in the model. 2 6 It is important to point out one techical detail in this case. The interpretation in this case ofbt is that it is the real value of the debt inclusive of the interest rate payment to be paid next period, that is, if all debt were one period bt = (1 + it) 2 7 The details of the derivation are in the appendix. In particular, =
conditions as the one obtained by linearizing the non-linear optimality conditions of the original non-linear government maximization problem that we described above. This provides the formal justi…cation of our simpli…ed approach.
Proposition 1
The linearized dynamic system of the non-linear Markov Perfect Equilibrium is equivalent to the linear dynamic system of the linear-quadratic Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
Proof. In Appendix.
Solution at positive interest rates
The complication in solving a Markov-perfect Equilibrium is that we do not know the unknown expectation functions E ; Y E , and S E : To solve this, we use the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. Provided that the expectation functions are di¤erentiable, the solution of the model is of the form
where b ; Y b ; S b ; i b ; b b ; T b ; r ; Y r ; S r ; i r ; b r ; and T r are unknown coe¢ cients to be determined. We make the assumption that the exogenous process r e t satis…es E t r e t+1 = r r e t where 0 < r < 1: Then (29) implies that the expectations are given by
We can then formulate the Lagrangian of the government problem. We substitute out for the expectation function using (30) and suppress the shock for simplicity
For now, we are not analyzing the e¤ects of the shock, and hence not carrying around r ; Y r ; S r ; i r ; b r ; and T r since our key area of interest at this state is not the e¤ect of the shock at positive interest rates. Instead, we will start focusing on the shock once the zero bound becomes binding.
The associated …rst order necessary conditions of the Lagrangian problem above and the envelope condition of the minimization problem of the government above are provided in the appendix. Our …rst substantiative result is that the equilibrium conditions can be simpli…ed, in particular by eliminating the Lagrange multipliers 1t 4t ; to get The most important relationships emerging from our analysis are captured by (31) and (32) . (31) is the so called "targeting rule" of our model. That represents the equilibrium (static) relationship among the three target variables t ;Ŷ t ; andT t that emerges from the optimization problem of the government.
(31) thus captures how target variables are related in equilibrium as governed both by the weights they are assigned in the loss function ( and T ) as well as the trade-o¤s among them as given by the private sector equilibrium conditions ( 1 and [
: Note in particular that 1 represents the trade-o¤ between t andŶ t as given by (25) while
1 represents the trade-o¤ between t andŶ t vs.T t as given by the combination of (24), (25), and (26). (32) is another optimality condition characterizing the Markov-perfect equilibrium and represents the "tax-smoothing objective"of the government. In contrast to similar expressions following the work of Barro (1979) , which would lead to taxes being a martingale, output appears in (32) because of sticky-prices, which makes output endogenous. Finally, because of the dynamic nature of (32), as opposed to (31), the unknown coe¢ cients that are critical for expectations of variables, b ; Y b ; and S b ; appear in (32). As we shall see -and this is again in contrast to the classic tax smoothing result in which debt is a random walk -the government will in general have an incentive to pay down public debt if it is above steady-state due to strategic reasons.
Debt dynamics, in ‡ation, and interest rates
Let us …rst consider the most basic exercise to clarify the logic of the government's problem. How do the dynamics of the model look like in the absence of shocks when the only di¤erence from steady state is that there is some initial value of debt with some …xed value of debt duration? To do this exercise we calibrate the model as follows. The parameter values we pick are given in Table 1 that is 30 percent above the steady state debt in the model. 28 We see that if debt is above steady state, it is paid over time back to steady state. For our baseline duration of 16 quarters (solid line), the half-life of debt repayment is about 30 quarters. Note that in this transition for this parameterization, in ‡ation is about 1 percent above steady state. Importantly, in the transition phase, we see that the real interest rate is below its steady state. As a consequence, output is also above its steady state value. Note that this result is in contrast to the classic Barro tax smoothing result whereby debt follows a random walk. The reason for this is that debt creates an incentive to create in ‡ation for a discretionary government as further described below. By paying down debt back to steady state, the government thus eliminates this incentive and achieves better outcomes.
The …gure illustrates that for a given maturity of government debt, debt is in ‡ationary and implies lower future real interest rate until a new steady state is reached. What is the logic for this result? Perhaps the best way to understand the logic is by inspecting the government budget constraint (26) . Recall that debt issued in nominal terms, although in the budget constraint we have rewritten it in terms ofb t =
This implies that for a given outstanding debtb t 1 ; any actual in ‡ation will reduce the real value of the outstanding debt. Accordingly we have the term 1 t term in the budget constraint which re ‡ects this in ‡ation incentive. As the literature has stressed in the past (see e.g. Calvo and Guidotti (1990 and 1992)), if prices are ‡exible then this will reduce actual debt in equilibrium only if the in ‡ation is unanticipated.
The reason for this is that otherwise anticipated in ‡ation will be re ‡ected one-to-one in the interest rate paid on the debt.
Apart from the inventive to depreciate the real value of the deb via in ‡ation, there is a second force at work in our model. In our model, the government is not only able to a¤ect the price level, it can also have an e¤ect on the real interest rate. Hence we see that in Figure 1 the real interest rate is below steady state during the entire transition path back to steady state. This will reduce the real interest rate payment the government needs to pay on debt -in contrast to the classic literature with ‡exible prices where the (ex-ante) real interest rate is exogenous. Intuitively, it may be most straight forward to see this force at work by simplifying the model down to the case in which = 0: In that case, the budget constraint of the government can be written asb
and nowb t is the real value of one period risk-free nominal debt in period t which is inclusive of interest paid (to relate to our prevision notation in 2 then when = 0 we have
Pt where B S t was the one period government debt that did not include interest payment). This expression makes clear that while t has a direct e¤ect by depreciating the real value of government debt, the government has another important margin by which it can in ‡uence its debt burden. The term{ t re ‡ects the cost or rolling-over-cost of the one-period debt. In particular, we see that if the interest rate is low, then the cost of rolling over debt is smaller. This latter mechanism will be critical when considering the e¤ects of varying debt maturity since its force is highly depending on the value of :
The role of duration of debt
We now consider how reducing the value of a¤ects the transition dynamics from last section. As noted before, our main interest for this is that a natural interpretation of quantitative easing is that it corresponds to a reduction in as in our model, as the duration of debt is given by (1 ) 1 : As Figure ( ??) reveals, where we consider a reduction in duration from 4 years to 3:42 and 2 years (dotted and dashed lines respectively), this increases in ‡ation in equilibrium considerably, but also reduce the real rate further. Similarly, we see that the debt is now paid down at a faster clip, a point we will return to.
To obtain some intuition for this result, let us again write out the budget constraint, this time substituting out for S t to obtainb
We observe here that the rollover interest rate is now multiplied by the term (1 ). Intuitively then, if a larger part of government debt is held with long maturity, the short-term rollover rate matters less, as the term of the loans are to a greater extent predetermined. Hence, the incentive of the government to lower the short-term interest rate are reduced.
Real interest rate incentives and duration of outstanding debt
How does the duration of debt a¤ect the real interest rate incentives of the central bank? The e¤ect on the real interest rate of lower duration is at the heart of the matter because what in ‡uences output is eventually the real interest rate and the aim in a zero lower bound situation is precisely to be able to decrease the short-term real interest rate (today and in future) even when the current short-term nominal interest rate is stuck at zero. That is, we are interested in the properties of
wherer t is the short-term real interest rate. This is important because in a liquidity trap situation, as is well-known, decreasing future real interest rate is key to mitigating negative e¤ects on output, and so, if r b depends negatively on duration, then we are able to provide a theoretical rationale for quantitative easing actions by the government. To clarify what is going on in the model, we …rst …nd it helpful to consider two special cases.
a) Fully ‡exible prices When prices are fully ‡exible, then as is well-known, monetary policy cannot control the (ex-ante) real interest rater t : Then, the only way monetary policy can a¤ect the economy is through surprise in ‡ation as debt is nominal. In fact there is a well-known literature that addresses the issue of how the duration of nominal debt in a ‡exible price environment a¤ects allocations under time consistent optimal monetary policy. For example, Calvo and Guidotti (1990 and 1992) address optimal maturity of nominal government debt in a ‡exible price environment while Sims (2013) explores how the response of in ‡ation to …scal shocks depends on the maturity of government debt under optimal monetary policy. We conduct a complementary exercise here and want to characterize how in ‡ation incentives depend on the duration of debt under optimal monetary and …scal policy under discretion. Thus, we are interested in how b depends on duration of debt. For this exercise, we can think of this special case of fully ‡exible prices as ! 1: Note however, that from the two optimality conditions (31) and (32), while under ‡exible prices T b = 0; there is indeterminacy in terms of in ‡ation and nominal interest rate dynamics. 29 This is a well-known result in monetary economics under discretion in a ‡exible price environment, and comes about because the government cannot a¤ect output and taxes can be put to zero with various combinations of in ‡ation and interest rate choices. To show our result on the role of the duration of debt, we follow the literature such as Calvo and Guidotti (1990 and 1992) and Sims (2013) and include a ( very small) aggregate social cost of in ‡ation that is independent of the level of price stickiness. Then, the objective of the government under ‡exible prices will be given by
where 0 parameterizes the cost of in ‡ation that is independent of sticky prices. Using 0 = 0:001 and the rest of the parameter values from Table 1 , Fig (2) shows how b depends on duration of debt (quarters). We see clearly that with shorter duration, there is more of an incentive to use current in ‡ation. The intuition for 2 9 Note that = " k : this result is that from (26), we see that everything else the same, when (and thereby, duration) decreases, then there will be a greater period by period incentive to increaseŜ t ; that is, keep nominal interest rates low to manage the debt burden. This, however, will increase current in ‡ation further in equilibrium according to our result. As a consequence -and perhaps a little counterintuitively -equilibrium nominal interest rate will generally increase as well with lower duration since the real rate is exogenously given under ‡exible prices. 30 In particular, observe that{ t = E t t+1 (sinceŶ t = 0 and there are no shocks) and hence i t is increasing one-to-one with expected in ‡ation.
b) Fully rigid prices Next we can consider the other extreme case: that of fully rigid prices. In this case, in ‡ation is zero in equilibrium and hence b = 0: Then, one can directly consider the e¤ects on the ex-ante real interest rate by analyzing the e¤ect on the nominal interest rate since
Thus, we are interested in how i b depends on the duration of debt. Using the parameters from Table 1 , Fig (3) shows how i b depends on duration of debt (quarters). We see that with shorter duration, there is more of an incentive to keep the nominal interest rate lower. The intuition for this result is again that from (26), when (and thereby, duration) decreases, then there will be more of an incentive to increaseŜ t ; that is keep interest rates low, to manage the debt burden. c) Partially rigid prices Having established the results in these two special cases, we now move on to the main mechanism in our paper in the intermediate and quantitatively relevant case of partially rigid prices. Fig (4) shows how r b depends on duration of debt (quarters) at di¤erent levels of : When the duration of debt in the hands of the public is shorter, it unambiguously provides an incentive to the government to keep the short-term real interest rate lower in future. The intuition again is that by doing so, it reduces the cost of rolling over the debt period by period. That is, if the debt is short-term, then current real short rates will more directly a¤ect the cost of rolling the debt over period by period, while the cost of rolling over long-term debt is not a¤ected in the same way period by period. Also note that when prices are more ‡exible, that is when is bigger, r b is a¤ected less typically and as we saw above, in the extreme of fully ‡exible prices, (ex-ante) real interest rate is not controlled by policy at all.
Figs. (5) and (6) show how r b depends on duration of debt at di¤erent levels of " and T respectively.
We do this since these parameters a¤ect the two weights in the loss-function and help us understand better the mechanics of the equilibrium. First, note that since = " k ; changing " will only a¤ect the weight on in ‡ation in the loss-function without a¤ecting any private sector equilibrium conditions. The e¤ect of a higher "; while not very important quantitatively, is to increase the response of the real interest rate. This is because with a higher weight on in ‡ation, since in ‡ation responds less (we show this below), the real interest 3 0 The way to understand how the model works in this case is to explore the government budget constraint. It is given bŷ
where again recall thatŜt = it + EtŜ t+1 : Under ‡exible prices when there are no shocks (soŶt = 0) then it = Et t+1 = b bt and recall thatbt = b bbt 1 : Solving forŜt and substituting for{t we can then rewrite the budget constraint aŝ
The term (1 )
bbt re ‡ects the cost of the government in rolling over the debt issued at t to t+1. Note that this cost depends on expected in ‡ation which can be reduced by lowering current debt (because future in ‡ation depends on this variable). The way current debt can be lowered is by creating in ‡ation today (and thus depreciate nominal debt issued last period) or raising taxes. The government does both in equilibrium. The more long-term is the debt (the higher is ); however, the smaller is this e¤ect since then a smaller part of the debt is rolled over on the current nominal interest rate (which depends directly on newly issued debtbt).
rate gets a¤ected by a higher degree. Finally, the comparative statics with respect to T are intuitive: as the weight on taxes in the loss-function increases, the real interest rate decreases by more in order to lower interest payments and reduce the need to raise taxes.
In ‡ation incentives and duration of outstanding debt
While the dependence of real interest rate incentive of the government on the duration of debt is the main mechanism of our paper, given the attention in ‡ation incentives receive in the literature, we now study how b varies with the duration of outstanding government debt? 31 Moreover, it helps us emphasize a point that just focusing on in ‡ation incentives might not be su¢ cient to understand the nature of optimal monetary and …scal policy in a liquidity trap situation.
While an analytical expression for b is available in the appendix and it is possible to show that b > 0 for all < 1, a full analytical characterization of the comparative statics with respect to the duration of debt is not available and so we rely on numerical results. Fig (7) below shows how b depends on duration of debt (quarters) at di¤erent levels of : As expected, b is positive at all durations in the …gure. 32 More importantly, note that that at our baseline parameterization of = 0:02; b does decrease with duration over a wide range of maturity. 33 At the same time, however, there is a hump-shaped behavior, with b increasing when duration is increased at very short durations.
What drives this result? First, note from (26) that everything else the same, when (and thereby, duration) decreases, then there will be an incentive to decreaseŜ t ; that is keep interest rates low to manage the debt burden. This will then increase in ‡ation in equilibrium. At the same time however, the government's incentives on in ‡ation are not fully/only captured by this reasoning. This is because what ultimately matters for the cost of debt is the real interest rate, which because of sticky prices, is endogenous and under the control of the central bank, and which we have seen before robustly depends negatively on the duration of debt. Therefore, to understand the overall e¤ect on the government's in ‡ation incentives, it is critical to analyze the targeting rule, as discussed above and given by (31 Fig (7) : as increases, the range at which b increases with duration gets narrower and the hump disappears in fact for = 3: 34 This is also completely consistent with what we in fact showed above 3 1 For some recent discussion and analysis of how in ‡ation dynamics in sticky-price models could depend on duration of government debt, see Sims (2011) and Faraglia et al (2012) . 3 2 Again, it is possible to show analytically that for all < 1; b > 0: In a very similar model but one with no steady-state debt, Eggertsson (2006) proved that b > 0 for = 0 (that is, for one period debt). Moreover, note that not surprisingly, b is higher at a given duration for higher : This simply re ‡ects the fact that prices are now more ‡exible and in ‡ation thus responds by more to a given level of outstanding debt. We also present some additional properties of b with respect to the two weights in the loss-function in order to understand the mechanics of the equilibrium. In Fig. (8) we see that as " and thereby increases, as expected, in ‡ation responds less to outstanding debt as in ‡ation now has a greater weight in the loss-function. Fig. (9) presents results of changing the value of T : As expected, now that taxes have a greater weight in the loss-function, in ‡ation responds by more to outstanding debt in order to devalue debt and reduce the tax burden.
Debt dynamics and duration of outstanding debt
While the primary focus so far is on properties of r b as it determines the real interest rate incentives of the central bank, it is also interesting to consider the properties of b b ; the parameter governing the persistence of government debt. This exercise is interesting in its own right, but more importantly, it is also worth exploring because as explained before, what is critical is the behavior of the real interest rate, and that gets Figs. (10)- (12) show how b b depends on duration of debt at di¤erent levels of ; "; and T respectively.
It is clear that the persistence of debt increases monotonically as the duration increases. 35 In fact, for a high enough duration, debt dynamics approach that of a random walk (b b = 1), as in the analysis of Barro (1979) . The persistence of debt increases with duration mainly because the response of the short-term real interest rate decreases, as we discussed above. Some of this e¤ect is re ‡ected in the response of in ‡ation decreasing as also discussed above. Thus, the existence of long-term nominal debt has an important impact on the dynamics of debt under optimal policy under discretion. Finally, intuitive comparative static results are in Fig. (12) : as the loss-function weight on taxes increases, debt is less persistent at any level of debt duration.
Having established that at positive interest rates, decreasing the duration of debt increases the incentives of the government to lower short-term real interest rates, we now move on to analyzing the case where the nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound.
At the zero lower bound
To model the case of a liquidity trap, we follow Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and suppose that a large enough negative shock to the e¢ cient rate of interest r e t ; driven by an increase in the desire to save, makes the zero lower bound binding. 36 Moreover, we also assume that r e t follows a two-state Markov process with an absorbing state: every period, with probability , r e t takes a (large enough) negative value of r e L while with probability 1
; it goes back to steady-state and stays there forever after. This means that the economy will exit the liquidity trap with a constant probability of 1 every period and that once it exits, it does not get into the trap again. The appendix contains details about the computation algorithm.
With this structure, we next consider the following policy experiment. At the liquidity trap, the level of debt is constant at b L , while out of the trap, it is optimally determined by the government according to the Markov-perfect equilibrium described previously. Then, we analyze what would be the e¤ect of changing the duration of debt once-and-for-all, while the zero lower bound is binding. In other words, we are interested in the comparative statics of the model as we vary the duration of debt at the liquidity trap. Note in particular that the steady-state market value of debt to taxes is always kept …xed in our experiments. For now a key abstraction is that the value of is …xed, an issue we will come back to in the last section.
Our calibrated parameter values for this experiment are given in Table 1 ; where we pick values in a similar strategy to Eggertsson (2006) : We pick and r e L to get a drop in output of 10%; to make the experiment relevant for the recent "Great Recession"in the United States, and a 2% percent drop in in ‡ation. We allow for debt while at the liquidity trap to be 30% above its steady-state value, which as we mentioned before is in line with the Dallas Fed data. We will consider the experiment of reducing the duration of government debt by 7 months, starting from 16 quarters. For average maturity of government debt and the reduction in the duration of government debt due to quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve, we use the recent estimates of Chadha, Turner, and Zampoli (2013) which suggest that the average maturity of treasury debt held outside the Federal Reserve was around 4 years in the last 10 years and that recent Federal Reserve balance sheet policies reduced the maturity by around 7 months.
Initial duration of government debt
Figs. (13) and (14) show the response of in ‡ation and output to a negative shock to the e¢ cient rate of interest when the duration of government debt is 16 quarters. The solid line shows the expected path for the variables (impulse response) while the thin lines show each possible economic contingency (thus the third thin line -for example -corresponds to the case in which the shock reverts to normal in the third quarter). As is clear, because of the zero lower bound constraint, the economy su¤ers from de ‡ation and because of the increase in the real interest rate that it creates (that is, a gap between the real interest rate and its e¢ cient counterpart), also from a negative e¤ect on output. This re ‡ects what Eggertsson (2006) labelled the "de ‡ation bias" of a discretionary central bank at the zero lower bound. In such a case, generating expectations of future in ‡ation would be very bene…cial as it would decrease the extent of de ‡ation and the rise of the real interest rate, as stressed by Krugman (1998) 
and Eggertsson (2006).
Observe, also, that because of the presence of nominal debt in the economy, the in ‡ation rate once the shock is over is not zero. Instead it is of the order of about 1 percent. This "in ‡ation bias" arises from the governments incentive to in ‡ate away the nominal value of the outstanding debt.
It would be bene…cial for the central bank to commit to keeping the short-term real interest rates lower in future, once the zero lower bound is no longer binding. This would decrease real long-term interest rates today and help spur the economy. Thus, one main goal of monetary policy would be to decrease the extent of increase in real interest rates (after the shock is over) that is seen in Fig. (15) . In other words, as Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson (2006) emphasize, the central bank needs to "commit to being irresponsible." 
Shorter duration of government debt
A reduction in the duration of government debt outstanding helps achieve this goal. Figs. (16) and (17) show the response of in ‡ation and output to a negative shock to the e¢ cient rate of interest when the duration of government debt is 13:7 quarters. As is clear by comparing with the case when the duration is 16 quarters, at the trap, the extent of de ‡ation is reduced by 95:4 basis points (annualized) as well as the negative e¤ect on output by 140 basis points. Note in particular that once the shock is over and the zero lower bound is no longer a constraint, the response of in ‡ation and output is higher compared to Figs. (13) and (14) .
The main reason why this is achieved is that because the government's balance sheet has more long-term bonds (or its debt is more short-term), the central bank keeps the short-term real interest rates lower in future, especially once the zero lower bound is not binding, in order to keep the real interest rate low on the debt it is rolling over. Thus, quantitative easing indeed provides a signal about the future conduct of monetary policy and in particular, the future path of short-term interest rates. This then enables it to have e¤ect on macroeconomic prices and quantities at the zero lower bound, as real interest rates also decline at the liquidity trap because of higher in ‡ationary expectations once the trap is over. The response of the real interest rate when the duration of debt is shorter is given in Fig. (18) , where by comparing with Fig.   (15) , one can see that the real interest rate increases by less at the trap and decreases by more out of the trap. This, then, is the central result of our paper: quantitative easing acts as a commitment device during a liquidity trap situation. 38 We also conduct an experiment of how long the duration reduction has to be in order for the output gap to be closed completely at the zero lower bound. We …nd that approximately doubling the size of the quantitative easing, that is, reducing the maturity by 20:6 months, would make the response of output zero at the liquidity trap. Figs. (19) - (21) show the responses of in ‡ation, output, and the real interest rate respectively in this case. As expected, this leads to a much bigger reduction in the real interest rate and much more of a boom in in ‡ation and output out of the trap.
At this point, we want to clarify an important element of our analysis: the distinction between nominal and real interest rates. A key to understanding optimal policy in the sticky price model at the zero bound is that it involves committing to lower future short-term real interest rates. The short term real interest rate is the di¤erence between future short-term nominal interest rate and expected in ‡ation. A lower short-term real interest rate can be achieved by either a lower future short-term nominal interest rate or higher future expected in ‡ation. A commitment of this kind will under some parameterization of the model be achieved via higher expected in ‡ation and higher future short-term nominal interest rates -even if the di¤erence between the two (the real rate) is going down. An implication of this is that a successful policy of quantitative easing aimed at lowering long-term real interest rate may involve an increase in expected future nominal interest rates and therefore, an increase in long-term nominal rates at the zero lower bound.
In fact, in our numerical experiments, this indeed does happen. Figs. (22) and (23) show the responses of the short and the long nominal interest rate when debt duration is 16 quarters while Figs. (24) and (25) show the responses when debt duration is 13:7 quarters. 39 As can be seen, the short-term nominal interest rate in fact rises by more once the trap is over when debt duration is 13:7 quarters and that the long-term nominal interest rate at the zero lower bound is higher by around 23 basis points. This aspect is relevant because some empirical analyses of the e¤ect of quantitative easing focus only on long-term nominal interest rates, which our analysis suggests is not a su¢ cient statistic. Even if long-term nominal interest rate decline very little in response to quantitative easing, or even if they increase (like in our example), this does not by itself suggest that the policy is ine¤ective, as long as the real interest rate is declining. 
Capital losses from reneging on optimal policy
We have emphasized and illustrated so far that the reason why lowering the duration of debt during a liquidity trap situation is bene…cial is that it provides incentives for the government to keep the real interest rate low in future as it is now rolling over more short-term debt. We have shown these results by comparing the path of the real interest rate under optimal policy at a baseline and lower duration of debt.
Another way of framing this is that otherwise it would su¤er capital losses on its balance sheet. These losses then would have to be accounted for by raising costly taxes. One way to illustrate the mechanism behind this result is to conduct the following thought experiment: suppose that once the liquidity trap is over, the government reneges on the path for in ‡ation and output dictated by optimal policy under discretion and instead perfectly stabilizes them at zero. In such a situation, how large are capital losses, or equivalently, how high do taxes have to rise out of zero lower bound compared to if the government had continued to follow optimal policy? In particular, is this increase in taxes more when debt is of shorter duration ? We show in Figs. (26) and (27) the change in taxes if the government were to renege on optimal policy at a duration of 16 and 13:7 quarters respectively. As is clear, the increase in taxes out of zero lower bound are higher at a shorter duration of outstanding debt. Thus indeed, lowering the duration of government debt provides the government with more an incentive to keep the real interest rate low in future in order to avoid having to raise costly taxes.
Robustness
We now conduct some robustness exercises. In particular, compared to the literature, we calibrated some new parameters in this paper: T (at 0 
Extension
So far, we have focused on analyzing a situation where the duration of government debt is reduced onceand-for all. That is, we have studied comparative statics experiments with respect to : A natural question that arises in this context is whether there is an incentive for the government to increase the duration of debt once the economy has recovered and if by not considering that, we are overstating our results.
To address this, we now extend our model to allow the government to pick the duration of government debt optimally, period by period. That is, now, is time-varying. In particular, the government issues a perpetuity bond in period t (B t ) which pays j t dollars j + 1 periods later. Following very similar manipulations as for the …xed duration case, the ‡ow budget constraint of the government can be written as
where S t ( t ) is the period-t price of the government bond that pays j t dollars j + 1 periods later while W t ( t 1 ) is the period-t price of the government bond that pays j t 1 dollars j+1 periods later. Moreover, b t = Bt Pt : Given these types of government bonds, the asset-pricing conditions then take the form
The rest of the model is the same as before.
The government's instruments are now i t ; T t ; and t . Moreover, it is clear from above that in addition to b t 1 ; now, t 1 is also a state variable in the model. Then, we can write the discretionary government's problem recursively as
subject to the three new constraints, (34)- (36), as well as the other private sector equilibrium conditions that are common from the model in the previous section. Here, U (:) is the utility function of the household in (1) and J(:) is the value function. 42 The detailed formulation of this maximization problem and the associated …rst-order necessary conditions are provided in the appendix. We discuss below why we take this non-linear as opposed to a linear-quadratic approach.
We proceed by computing the non-stochastic steady-state and then taking a …rst-order approximation of the non-linear government optimality conditions as well as the non-linear private sector equilibrium conditions around the steady-state. Of particular note is that a …rst-order approximation of (34)-(36) leads
Thus, after undertaking a transformation of variables as given by (38), (37) takes the same form as (26) , the linearized government budget constraint when there was no time variation in duration. Thus, time-variation in duration does not play a separate role in government debt dynamics upto …rst order. Therefore, if we had taken a linear-quadratic approach, like before, then with the quadratic loss-function (28) and the linearized private sector equilibrium conditions including (37), we would not be able to solve for optimal debt duration dynamics at all.
Given this appropriate rede…nition of the state variable, we can show that the (bounded) solution of the model at positive interest rates takes the form Two results stand out: …rst,^ t follows a random-walk like behavior; second,^ t 1 does not a¤ect directly other other variables such as output, in ‡ation, and the real interest rate. This suggests then that even if we allow the government to pick the duration optimally period by period, there is no incentive for it to increase the duration of debt after the economy has recovered following a liquidity trap episode. Therefore, the simple comparative static analysis that we focussed on in the main part of the paper does not appear to be overstating our results.
Conclusion
We present a theoretical model where open market operations that reduce the duration of outstanding government debt, so called "quantitative easing,"are not neutral because they a¤ect the incentive structure of the central bank. In particular, in a Markov-perfect equilibrium of our model, reducing the duration of outstanding government provides an incentive for the central bank to keep short-term interest rates low in future in order to avoid balance sheet losses. When the economy is in a liquidity trap, such a policy is thus e¤ective at generating in ‡ationary expectations and lowering long-term interest rates, which in turn, helps mitigate the de ‡ation and negative output gap that would ensue otherwise. In other words, quantitative easing is e¤ective because it provides a "signal" to the private sector that the central bank will keep the short-term real interest rates low even when the zero lower bound is no longer a constraint in future.
In future work, it would be of interest to evaluate fully the quantitative importance of our model mechanism in a medium-scale sticky price model, along the lines of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) . Computation of Markov-perfect equilibrium under coordinated monetary and …scal policy at the ZLB appears to not have been investigated for such models in the literature If one departs from the assumption of an e¢ cient steady-state, which would preclude a linear-quadratic approach, this extension is likely to involve a substantial computation innovation. Moreover, as a methodological extension, it would be fruitful to allow for time-varying duration of government debt to a¤ect real variables.
To do so, it will be necessary to take a higher order approximation of the equilibrium conditions and modify the guess-and-verify algorithm to compute the Markov-perfect equilibrium accordingly. Figure 1: Responses at positive interest rates to a 30% increase in debt outstanding at di¤erent durations of government debt. Following Woodford (2001) , the perpetuity issued in period t pays j dollars j + 1 periods later, for each j 0 and some decay factor 0 < 1 : The implied steady-state duration of this bond is then (1 ) 1 : Let the price of a newly issued bond in period t be St ( ) : Given the existence of the unique stochastic discount factor Q t;t+j , we can write this price as
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Now consider the period t + 1 price of such a bond that was issued in period t: We can then write the price S O t+1 ( )
since
This is highly convenient since it implies that one needs to keep track, at each point in time, of the equilibrium price of only one type of bond. Next, we derive an arbitrage condition between this perpetuity and a one-period bond. By simple expansion of the in…nite sums above and manipulation of the terms, one gets
Since EtQ t;t+1 = 1 1 + it we get
Substituting further for S O t+1 ( ) = S t+1 ( ); we then derive
Finally, consider the ‡ow budget constraint of the government
This can be simpli…ed using S O t+1 ( ) = S t+1 ( ) to
This is the form in which we write down the ‡ow budget constraint of the household and the government in the main text.
Functional forms
We make the following functional form assumptions on preferences and technology
where we only consider a discount factor shock . Note that = 1 in steady-state and that in steady state, we scale hours such that Y = 1 as well. This implies that we can derivẽ
E¢ cient equilibrium
As benchmark, we …rst derive the e¢ cient allocation. Using Gt = Ft s(Tt T ) = F s(Tt T ); the social planner's problem can be written as
Formulate the Lagrangian
FOCs (where all the derivatives are to be equated to zero)
Eliminating the Lagrange multiplier gives
Note that we make the following functional form assumptions on the tax collection cost
E¢ cient allocation thus requires
In steady state, without aggregate shocks, we have
8.3 Non-linear markov equilibrium
Optimal policy under discretion
The policy problem can be written as
Formulate the period Lagrangian 
First-order conditions (where all the derivatives should be equated to zero) The complementary slackness conditions are 1t 0; it 0; 1t it = 0
While the envelope condition is
This also implies that
Steady-state
A Markov-perfect steady-state is non-trivial to characterize because generally, we need to take derivatives of an unknown function, as is clear from the FOCs. Here, we will rely on the fact that given an appropriate production subsidy, the Markovperfect steady-state will be the same as the e¢ cient steady-state derived above.
First, note that this requires no resource loss from price-adjustment costs, which in turn requires
and thereby ensures
This means that we need = 1:
Next, note from the Phillips curve that this means, we need
Now, since the e¢ cient steady-state has u C =ṽ Y ; the production subsidy then has to satisfy
We will be looking at a steady-state with positive interest rates
which means that
and that from the FOC wrt it we have
Also, given that taxes are at steady-state, g G ( s 0 (Tt T )) = 0; from the FOC wrt Tt
Given this, in turn, we have from the FOC wrt St
Then, given that d 0 = 0 in steady-state and d 00 is not, and since 1 = 0; it gives from the FOC wrt to t
Note that this is highly convenient since these Lagrange multipliers being zero implies
Thus, we do not need to worry about the derivatives of the unknown functions. This proposed steady-state is consistent with other FOCs. For example, the FOC wrt Yt is now given by
and that the FOC wrt Ct is given by
Finally, FOC wrt bt implies
which is also consistent with the conjectured guess. Finally, the guess of the steady-state is also consistent with the other model equilibrium conditions, with S( ) given by
that is S( ) = 1 :
Then b and F are linked by
First-order approximation
We now take a log-linear approximation of the Markov perfect FOCs and the private sector equilibrium conditions around the steady-state above. Also, lets normalize the scale of the economy (with appropriate scaling of hours) so that Y = 1: This implies C = 1 F: Also the shock t takes a value of 1 in steady-state.
Private sector equilibrium conditions We …rst start with the private sector equilibrium conditions. We denote variables that are in log-deviations from their respective steady-states by hats, except for{t:We denote variables in steady-state by bars. First,
which can be simpli…ed by making use of the log-linearized resource constraint above to yield
Note here that this implies that the e¢ cient rate of interest is given by
Fourth,
which can be simpli…es by making use of the log-linearized resource constraint above to yield
Note here that by using the log-linearized Euler equation above, one can further simplify as
Moreover, since
we have …nally as the asset-pricing condition{ t +Ŝt = EtŜ t+1 :
which is simpli…ed further asb
Then, …nally, the expectation functions are given bŷ
Markov-perfect FOCs Here, note that since all the Lagrange multipliers except one are zero in steady-state, what we mean by hats will in fact only be deviations from steady-state for all the lagrange multipliers (as opposed to log-deviations). First,
and since
Second,
Third,
Fifth,
TTt +^ 1t = 0:
Seventh (after some replacements),
gives
8.4 Linear-quadratic approach
Linear approximation of equilibrium conditions
We approximate around an e¢ cient non-stochastic steady-state where = 1: For simplicity, from here on we will assume that the only shock that hits the economy is a discount factor shock given by . Standard manipulations that are prevalent in the literature, for example in Woodford (2003) , and as shown above in the Markov perfect equilibrium, give (24) and (25) where
. Here we again detail the derivations of (26) and (27) . Given b; log-linearization gives immediatelŷ
Note that also the following relationship holds in steady state F = G: We …nally derive an expression for r e t ; the e¢ cient rate of interest r e t =~ 1 ( t Et t+1 ) :
Quadratic approximation of household utility
For household utility, we need to approximate the following three components
Standard manipulations that are prevalent in the literature, for example in Woodford (2003) , give as a second-order approximation to household utility 1 2
which is in turn given as
Now lets multiply everything by the …rst-order necessary conditions are given by
while the envelope condition is given by
which implies
We can then combine the envelope condition with the last FOC to yield
To summarize, we have
which can be simpli…ed to get
The …nal step is then to match coe¢ cients after replacing the conjectured solutions
which in turn can be simpli…ed to get
[(1 )
We now show some properties of b analytically. First, note that we will be restricting to stationary solutions, that is one where j b b j< 1: Manipulations of (41) In this knife-edge case, note that one needs > 1: Moreover, since the upper bound on is 1 ; one needs to ensure that
This is a fairly restrictive parameterization (not ful…lled in our baseline, for example). Still, it is instructive to note that in this case of when b does reach 0; then it is indeed possible to show analytically that b declines as duration is increased while comparing = 0 with = 1 + 
Equivalence of the two approaches
We now show the equivalence of the linearized dynamic systems for non-linear and linear-quadratic approaches. Consider the system of equations describing private sector equilibrium and optimal government policŷ 1 + S b^ 1t u C d 
Under additional functional assumptions outlined in previous sections we get
The …rst four equations are equivalent to their counterparts in the LQ-approach once one use the functional form assumptions to get u C u CC = ~ and introduce new notation " ( vyy u CC ) u C d 00 = :
The latter relation implies " +~ 1 = d 00 :
Let us guess solutions for all variables for the case when the ZLB is slack as a linear function ofb t 1 andr e t . Then the expectations will take formf Also under the assumption about the process^ t we get
When the economy is out of ZLBr e t = 0: Now we can …nd explicit representation for the lagrange multiplierŝ 
Computation at ZLB
In our experiment the debt is kept …xed at the zero lower bound at b L . Moreover, at the zero lower bound,{t = 1 1 .
Given the speci…c assumptions on the two-state Markov shock process, the equilibrium is described by the system of equationŝ
where variables with a b subscript denote the solution we compute at positive interest rates while variables with a L subscript denote values at the ZLB. The solution to this system iŝ
where the solution for variables with a b subscript has already been provided above.
Non-linear markov equilibrium of extended model
We now consider a model where the duration of government debt is time-varying and chosen optimally by the government.
The policy problem can be written as 
